Statistical Approach to Detection of Attacks for Stochastic
  Cyber-Physical Systems by Marelli, Damián et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
11
65
4v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  3
1 J
an
 20
20
1
Statistical Approach to Detection of Attacks for
Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems
Damia´n Marelli1, Tianju Sui2,†, Minyue Fu3, Fellow IEEE and Renquan Lu4
Abstract—We study the problem of detecting an attack on a
stochastic cyber-physical system. We aim to treat the problem
in its most general form. We start by introducing the notion of
asymptotically detectable attacks, as those attacks introducing
changes to the system’s output statistics which persist asymp-
totically. We then provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for asymptotic detectability. This condition preserves generality
as it holds under no restrictive assumption on the system and
attacking scheme. To show the importance of this condition,
we apply it to detect certain attacking schemes which are
undetectable using simple statistics. Our necessary and sufficient
condition naturally leads to an algorithm which gives a confidence
level for attack detection. We present simulation results to
illustrate the performance of this algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a physical system which
is monitored or controlled via a communication channel.
It finds a wide range of applications such as traffic signal
systems [1], health care [2], energy manufacturing [3], power
system [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], the water industry [9], [10].
A CPS is prone to attacks in the form of signals injected
through the communication link [2]. These attacks are known
to have caused a number of serious accidents around the
world [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. They have generated urgency
for detecting such attacks.
In principle, an attack may be regarded as a system fault.
This permits using methods for fault tolerant control, such as
robust statistics [16], robust control [17] and failure detection
and identification [18]. However, the essential difference be-
tween an attack and a fault is that the design of the former
aims at making it difficult for detection. For example, Liu et
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al studied how to inject a stealthy input into the measurement
without being detected by the classical failure detector [19].
Hence, methods for CPS attack detection need to take special
care of this difference.
Early works on CPS attack detection rely on certain prior
knowledge of the attacker’s model. Among these methods,
we find: The work in [20], deals with a kind of attack
called denial of service. The works [19] and [21] concentrate
on false data injection attacks against state estimation. The
authors of [22] introduced stealthy deception attacks, which
consist in manipulating the measurements to be processed
by a power system state estimator in such a manner that
the resulting systematic errors introduced by the adversary
are either undetected or only partially detected by a bad
data detection method. In [23], the effect of replay attacks
is studied. Smith investigated the behavior of control systems
under covert attacks [24], where a malicious agent can access
the signals and information within the control loop and use
them to disrupt or compromise the controlled plant.
It is often unrealistic to assume that the defender has some
knowledge of the attacker’s model. To address this concern,
recent works have studied the CPS attack problem without
an attacking model assumption. In this line, Pasqualetti et
al studied the problem of detectability, by describing the
undetectable/unidentificable attack class, consisting of attacks
not detectable by any kind of detection method [25]. Using this
concept, they studied in [25], [26] the design of centralized and
distributed attack detection methods. However, this approach
is limited to systems without process and measurement noises.
The study of systems involving random noises is much more
challenging, since these systems present more ambiguities
where attacks can be hidden.
Concerning the detection of attacks in systems with noise,
Mo and Sinopoli [27] analyzed the estimation error introduced
by an attack which is not detected by a χ2 failure detector.
They also studied in [28] the attacks on scalar systems with
multiple sensors. In [29], the authors introduce the notion
of strictly stealthy and ǫ-stealthy attacks, and bound the
performance deterioration achievable by such attacks.
In this work we move a step forward in the research line
described above. As in [27], [28], [29], we also study systems
with noise. We start by introducing the notion of asymptoti-
cally stealthy attacks, as an extension of the definition of strict
stealthiness given in [29], to the case where the system and
attack are non-stationary. More precisely, strict stealthiness
means that the attack does not change the output statistics.
Therefore, it cannot be detected by any method using statistical
knowledge of the system’s output. However, if the detector
2only knows a single realization of the system’s output, this
definition is too restrictive. We relax this condition, by defining
an attack to be asymptotically stealthy if the changes it induces
on output statistics banish asymptotically. We then define an
attack to be asymptotically detectable if it is not asymptotically
stealthy. Some rigorous statistical setup is required to make our
definition precise.
To make the notion of asymptotic detectability verifiable,
we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This
condition is expressed in terms of certain statistical properties,
which are in principle testable using the knowledge of a
single realization. The condition is given without requiring
any assumption on the attacking model, and, under mild
regularity conditions, is valid for the general case in which
the system being attacked is time-varying, non-linear and with
non-Gaussian noises. We also specialize this condition for the
case of stationary linear system with Gaussian noises.
To appreciate the importance of the introduced notion
of asymptotic detectability and the provided necessary and
sufficient condition, we give two examples of attacks, which
cannot be detected by checking commonly used statistics, but
are instead detected by checking our condition.
In view of our main result, testing that an attack is detectable
requires verifying a condition which is numerically intractable.
To fill this gap, we derive a practically feasible detection
algorithm. While we do so for the case in which the system
is linear and Gaussian, the algorithm can be readily extended
to arbitrary non-linear non-Gaussian systems. Also, while the
class of attacks that can be detected by this algorithm is smaller
than the class of asymptotically detectable attacks, the differ-
ence between these two classes can be made arbitrarily small
by sufficiently increasing the complexity of the algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the required statistical background. In Section III
we describe the attack detection problem. In Section IV we
introduce the definition of asymptotically detectable attacks.
In Section V we give a necessary and sufficient condition for
asymptotic detectability. More precisely, in Section V-A we
treat the general case, and in Section V-B we specialize this
result for the case of stationary linear system with Gaussian
noises. In Section VI, we discuss attack examples which
cannot be detected by checking other simpler conditions. In
Section VII we use our condition to derive the detection
algorithm. In Section VIII we use simulations to illustrate the
superiority of our algorithm for detecting attacks that cannot
be detected by other simpler methods. Finally, concluding
remarks are stated in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notation 1. We use N to denote the set of integers, R+
to denote the set of non-negative real numbers and R¯ =
R ∪ {−∞,∞} to denote the set of extended real numbers.
For a vector x we use [x]i to denote its i-th entry and for
a matrix X we use [X ]i,j to denote its (i, j)-th entry. For
a vector or matrix X , we use X⊤ to denote its transpose.
For vectors x and y, x ≺ y (x  y) means that [x]i < [y]i
([x]i ≤ [y]i), for all i, and z = x ∧ y denotes the vector
with entries [z]i = min(xi, yi). We use 1 to denote a column
vector of ones, I to denote the identity matrix, q to denote the
forward-shift operator, i.e., (qx)t = xt+1, and χS to denote
the indicator function of the set s, i.e., χS(x) = 1, if x ∈ S
and 0 otherwise. We also use φµ,Σ and Φµ,Σ to denote the
probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution
function (CDF), respectively, of the normal distribution with
mean µ and covariance matrix Σ.
Notation 2. Let SD =
(
R
D
)N
denote the set of all sequences
x =
(
xt ∈ RD : t ∈ N
)
indexed by the naturals. Let SD
denote the sigma algebra on SD generated by the cylinder
sets
Ct (A) =
{
x ∈ SD : xt ∈ A
}
.
Definition 1. Let (Ω,A,P) denote a probability space. A D-
dimensional random process is a map x : Ω→ SD, measurable
with respect to A and SD. Its probability distribution p is
p (x ∈ S) = P ◦ x−1 (S) for all S ∈ SD.
A random process x is said to be asymptotically mean sta-
tionary (AMS) [30, S 7.3] if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
p
(
qtx ∈ S) exists for all S ∈ SD.
In this case, the associate stationary probability distribution p¯
is defined by
p¯ (x ∈ S) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
p
(
qtx ∈ S) for all S ∈ SD. (1)
For a measurable map f : SD → R, we define its stationary
mean by
E¯ {f(x)} =
∫
f(x)dp¯.
Also, x is said to be ergodic [30, S 7.7] if, for all S ∈ SD,
qS = S ⇒ p (qx) = 0 or 1.
AMS and ergodicity are properties which are stated in a
rather technical way. Roughly speaking, the AMS property
is required for all limits of sample averages to exist w.p.1.
Also, ergodicity is required for these limit values to be equal
w.p.1. These statements are made precise by the AMS ergodic
theorem [30, Th. 8.1].
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We have the following system in state-space form
xt+1 = ft (xt, wt) , (2)
yt = gt (xt, vt) , (3)
where ft : R
C × RA → RC and gt : RC × RB → RD
are (measurable) non-linear time-varying functions, and the
process noise wt, t ∈ Z, and measurement noise vt, t ∈ Z,
are sequences of random vectors. We assume that y is AMS,
ergodic, and its distribution p (y ∈ S), S ∈ SD is absolutely
continuous.
3Consider an attacker, which interferes the measurement
signal yt, replaces it with an attacking signal zt, and sends
zt instead of yt to the receiver. In order to treat the problem
in its full generality, we assume that zt is generated by an
arbitrary (possibly non-linear and non-stationary) measurable
function of the whole history of ys up to time t, i.e.,
zt = ht (ys : t ≥ s ∈ N) .
Problem 1. The attack detection problem consists in assessing
whether or not z = y.
Definition 2. We say that the statistics of a random vari-
able/process are nominal if they equal those which occur when
z = y. The probability law and expected value taken with
respect to these statistics are denoted by p⋆ (·) and E⋆ {·},
respectively.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC DETECTABILITY
In order to assess whether z = y, all the information that we
have is a single realization of z and the probability distribution
of y, i.e., p(y ∈ S), for all S ∈ SD . The latter equals the
nominal probability distribution p⋆(z ∈ S) of z, i.e., when
there is no attack. In [29], under the assumption that y is
stationary, an attack was defined to be (strictly) stealthy if it
satisfies a condition which is equivalent to
p (z ∈ S) = p⋆ (z ∈ S) for all S ∈ S. (4)
In the case in which y is non-stationary, since we only know a
single realization of z, it is impossible to check (4). However,
we can still hope to check whether the stationary distribution
of z (cf. (1)) matches its nominal value, provided both exist.
This leads to our definition of asymptotic stealthiness and
asymptotic detectability listed below, which do not require the
existence of either stationary distribution.
Definition 3. We say that z is asymptotically stealthy if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
p
(
qtz ∈ S)− p⋆ (qtz ∈ S)] = 0 for all S ∈ S.
(5)
Otherwise, we say that z is asymptotically detectable.
Remark 1. An attack is asymptotically detectable if it causes a
modification in the probability distribution p (qtz ∈ S) which
is persistent over time. Hence, in particular, every finite-
time attack is asymptotically stealthy. Asymptotic detectability
essentially means that it is possible to detect the presence
of the attack, with a confidence that tends to one as the
number of observed samples tends to infinity. Obviously, in
a practical setting, any method aiming at approximating the
Cesa`ro summation in (5) will be carried out over a sliding
time window of finite length. This permits detecting finite-time
attacks with a confidence that depends on the window length
and the duration of the attack. We derive one such methods
in Section VII, and discus the choice of the sliding window
length in Remark 4.
V. A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
ASYMPTOTIC DETECTABILITY
Our definition of asymptotic detectability is obviously im-
practical, because it requires considering all possible test
functions which are integrable under the nominal distribution.
In this section we provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for asymptotic detectability. In Section V-A we do so for the
general case described in Section III, and in Section V-B we
specialize this result for the case in which the system (2)-(3)
is stationary, linear, and with Gaussian noises.
A. The general case
Let L ∈ N, ζ(L)t =
[
z⊤t , · · · , z⊤t+L−1
]⊤
and ρ ∈ RLD. Let
also
F
(L)
⋆ (ρ) = p¯⋆
(
ζ
(L)
1  ρ
)
, (6)
be the nominal CDF of ζ
(L)
1 . For each T ∈ N, let
F
(L)
T (ρ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
χ{
ζ
(L)
t ρ
}(ρ), (7)
be a sample approximation of the true stationary CDF
F (L)(ρ) = p¯
(
ζ
(L)
1  ρ
)
. The next theorem uses these def-
initions to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
asymptotic stealthiness.
Theorem 1. If y is AMS, ergodic and its distribution is
absolutely continuous, the process z is asymptotically stealthy
if and only if, for all L ∈ N and ρ ∈ RLD,
lim
T→∞
F
(L)
T (ρ)
w.p.1
= F
(L)
⋆ (ρ). (8)
We devote the rest of the section to the proof of Theorem 1.
Notation 3. For x, y ∈ SD, we define the distance
d (x, y) =
∞∑
t=1
2−t (1 ∧ |xt − yt|) .
As shown in [31, p. 241], under the topology induced by d,
S
D is separable and complete. For a set S ∈ SD , we use S¯
to denote its closure under this topology. Also, we use ∂S =
S¯ ∩ (SD \ S) to denote the boundary of S.
For L, T ∈ N, and S ∈ SD , let the measure p¯T (z ∈ ·) :
SD → R+ be defined by
p¯T (z ∈ S) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
p
(
qtz ∈ S) .
For L ∈ N and ρ ∈ R¯LD, let RLρ ∈ SD be the set
RLρ =
{
x ∈ SD : [x⊤1 , · · · , x⊤L ]⊤  ρ} .
Lemma 1. If y is AMS and its distribution is absolutely
continuous, then p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂S) = 0, for any S ∈ SD.
Proof: We split the proof in steps:
Step 1) Let R = {RLρ : L ∈ N, ρ ∈ R¯LD}. Let L,M ∈ N,
ρ ∈ R¯LD and λ ∈ R¯MD. Without loss of generality, suppose
4that M ≥ L, and let ρ˜ = [ρ⊤,∞, · · · ,∞]⊤ be padded so that
ρ˜ ∈ R¯MD . We have
RLρ ∩RMλ = RMρ˜ ∩RMλ = RMρ˜∧λ.
Hence, R is a π-system [32, Def. 1.1].
Step 2) Let M denote the collection of sets M ⊆ SD such
that p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂M) = 0. We have that
p¯⋆
(
zˇ ∈ ∂SD) = p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∅) = 0.
Also, if M ⊂ N ∈M,
p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂ (N \M)) = p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂N ∪ ∂M)
≤ p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂N) + p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂M) = 0,
and, if Mk ∈ M, k ∈ N, are disjoint, and M =
⊎
k∈NMk,
then,
p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂ (M)) ≤
∑
k∈N
p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ ∂Mk) = 0.
Hence, M is a λ-system [32, Def. 1.10].
Step 3) Let δ (R) be the smallest λ-system containing
R. Since the distribution of y is absolutely continuous, then
clearly so is its stationary distribution p¯ (y ∈ S). Hence, since
the latter equals p¯⋆ (z ∈ S), we have R ⊆ M and M is
a λ-system, then δ (R) ⊆ M. Thus, from Dynkin’s π-λ
theorem [32, Th. 1.19], δ (R) = σ (R). But from [32, Th.
1.23] and the definition of SD , σ (R) = SD. So we have that
SD ⊆M and the result follows.
Lemma 2. If y is AMS, its distribution is absolutely continu-
ous and (8) holds, then z is AMS and for all S ∈ SD ,
p¯ (z ∈ S) = p¯⋆ (z ∈ S) . (9)
Proof: Let tk ∈ N, for k = 1, · · · ,K , and τ =
[t1, · · · , tK ]⊤. Let also λk ∈ R¯D , for k = 1, · · · ,K , and
λ =
[
λ⊤1 , · · · , λ⊤K
]⊤
. Consider the set Dτλ ∈ SD defined by
Dτλ =
{
x ∈ SD : xtk  λ
}
.
We have that Dτλ = R
L
ρ , where L = tk and ρ =[
ρ⊤1 , · · · , ρ⊤L
]⊤
with ρl = λl if l = tk and ∞1 otherwise.
We then have that, for all τ and λ,
lim
T→∞
p¯T (z ∈ Dτλ) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
{
χ{
ζ
(L)
t ρ
} (ρ)
}
(a)
= E
{
lim
T→∞
F
(L)
T (ρ)
}
(b)
= F
(L)
⋆ (ρ) = p¯⋆ (z ∈ Dτλ) ,
where (a) follows from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem and (b) follows from (8). It then follows from [31,
Example 2.4] that the sequence of probability measures
p¯T (z ∈ ·) : SD → R+ converges weakly to p¯⋆ (z ∈ ·), i.e., for
all f ∈ Cb
(
SD
)
(the space of continuous bounded functions
on SD),
lim
T→∞
∫
fdp¯T =
∫
fdp¯⋆.
It the follows from [31, Th. 2.1], that, for each S ∈ SD , with
p¯⋆ (z ∈ ∂S) = 0,
lim
T→∞
p¯T (z ∈ S) = p¯⋆ (z ∈ S) .
Then, (9) follows from the above since, in view of Lemma 1,
p¯⋆ (z ∈ ∂S) = 0 holds for all S ∈ SD.
Proof of Theorem 1: Only if part: If z is asymptotically
stealthy, since y is AMS, the clearly so is z. Also, since
p¯⋆ (z ∈ S) = p¯ (y ∈ S), for all S ∈ SD , and y is AMS and
ergodic, it follows from [30, Lemma 7.13] that z is ergodic.
Then, from the AMS ergodic theorem [30, Th. 8.1],
lim
T→∞
F
(L)
T (ρ)
w.p.1
= E¯⋆
{
χRLρ (z)
}
= F
(L)
⋆ (ρ),
and (8) holds.
If part: If (8) holds, since y is AMS, the asymptotic
stealthiness of z follows immediately from Lemma 8.
B. The stationary linear Gaussian case
In this subsection we specialize the result of Theorem 1 for
the case in which (2)-(3) have the following form
xt+1 = Axt + wt,
yt = Cxt + vt,
with wt ∼ N (0, Q) and vt ∼ N (0, R). We also assume
that the system is in steady state, i.e., xt ∼ N (0, P ), with
P = APA⊤ +Q.
If we run a Kalman filter, in steady state we obtain
xˆt+1|t = Axˆt|t−1 +K
(
zt − Cxˆt|t−1
)
, (10)
K = AΨC⊤
(
CΨC⊤ +R
)−1
,
where Ψ is the solution of
Ψ = AΨA⊤ −AΨC⊤ (CΨC⊤ +R)−1 CΨA⊤ +Q.
Let zˆt|t−1 = Cxˆt|t−1, z˜t = zt − zˆt|t−1 and Γ = CΨC⊤ +R.
Let also
zˇt = Γ
−1/2z˜t. (11)
Under nominal statistics, we have that Γ is the covariance
of z˜t. Thus, since the samples of z˜ are independent, those
of zˇ are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), with
zˇt ∼ N (0, I). In view of this, it would be numerically more
convenient if the condition of Theorem 1 could be given in
terms of zˇ. This is done in the next corollary of Theorem 1.
Let Fˇ
(L)
T be defined as in (7), but with zˇ in place of z.
Corollary 1. The process z is asymptotically stealthy if and
only if, for all L ∈ N and ρ ∈ RLD,
lim
T→∞
Fˇ
(L)
T (ρ)
w.p.1
= Φ0,I(ρ). (12)
Proof: We split the proof in steps:
Step 1) Clearly, if the statistics of z are nominal, then so are
those of zˇ (i.e., it is i.i.d. with zˇt ∼ N (0, I)). The converse
also holds since zt is fully determined by (zˇs : t ≥ s ∈ Z), via
the recursions
xˆt+1|t = Axˆt|t−1 +KΓ
1/2zˇt, zt = Cxˆt|t−1 + Γ
1/2zˇt.
It is then straightforward to check that p¯ (z ∈ S) = p¯⋆ (z ∈ S)
if and only if p¯ (zˇ ∈ S) = p¯⋆ (zˇ ∈ S). Hence, asserting that z
has nominal stationary statistics is equivalent to asserting that
zˇ also has.
5Step 2) Since y is AMS, z has nominal stationary statistics
if and only if it is asymptotically stealthy. The same conclusion
can be drawn for zˇ. Then, combining these two facts with the
conclusion from Step 1), we obtain that z is asymptotically
stealthy if and only if so is zˇ.
Step 3) Let yˇ be defined as zˇ but using y in place of z.
Clearly, yˇ satisfies the conditions of y in Theorem 1. It then
follows from that theorem that zˇ is asymptotically stealthy
if and only if (12) holds. The result then follows from the
conclusion of Step 2).
Remark 2. The family of tests (12) can be understood as
a normality test. More precisely, as checking the following
condition
zˇt ∼ N (0, I) is i.i.d. (13)
Corollary 1 asserts that this test enjoys the property of being
equivalent of the asymptotic stealthiness of the process z.
However, notice that not every normality test run on the
sequence zˇt may enjoy this property, and therefore usable for
assessing asymptotic stealthiness.
VI. ATTACK EXAMPLES WHOSE DETECTION REQUIRES
THEOREM 1
Checking the condition of Corollary 1 essentially means
checking that the stationary probability distribution p¯ of zˇ
equals the nominal one p¯⋆, i.e., that under the distribution
p¯, (13) holds. As it is known, from a theoretical point of
view, checking that a block of samples has joint standard
normal distribution is a stronger requirement than doing some
other more practical checks, e.g., for pairwise independence or
uncorrelation. However, the question arise as to whether, for
the purposes of detecting an attack, it is really necessary to
carry out a full distribution check, or if instead, a simpler test
would be enough. In this section we provide two examples
showing how an asymptotically detectable attack can pass
undetected if a test checking only for uncorrelation or pairwise
independence is used. This supports our claim that checking
the condition of Theorem 1 is indeed needed.
A. Checking for uncorrelation
By combining a normality test for i.i.d. samples [33],
together with a test for uncorrelation [34, §14.2], we can verify
the following condition
zˇt ∼ N (0, I) and E¯⋆
{
zˇtzˇ
⊤
s
}
= 0, ∀t 6= s. (14)
Condition (13) is stronger that (14), in the sense that the former
requires that zˇt and zˇs are statistically independent, rather than
uncorrelated, when t 6= s. In this section we describe an attack
example which can be detected by a method verifying (13),
but not by one verifying (14).
Suppose that we feed the output y to the Kalman filter (10).
Let yˇt ∼ N (0, I) denote the resulting normalized prediction
error, obtained as in (11). Let τ ∈ N, 0 < α < 1 and γt be an
i.i.d. sequence of random variables with Bernoulli distribution
B(0.5). Let r0 ∼ N (0, I) and
rt = αrt−τ +
√
1− α2yˇt, zˇt = γtrt. (15)
Since yˇt ∼ N (0, I) is i.i.d., it is straightforward to see that
rt ∼ N (0, I). Hence zˇt ∼ N (0, I). Also, if t 6= s,
E {zˇtzˇ⊤s } = (1− α2) E {γt} E {γs} E {rtrs} = 0.
Hence, the process zˇ satisfies (14). However, since
zˇt = γt
(
αrt−τ +
√
1− α2yˇt
)
, zˇt−τ = γt−τrt−τ ,
the vector
[
zˇ⊤t , zˇ
⊤
t−τ
]⊤
is clearly not Gaussian. Hence, zˇ does
not satisfy (13). Since the attacker knows ys, for all s ≤ t, it
can always build the attacking signal at so that the normalized
prediction error zˇ at the receiver equals the one described
above. Such an attack can be detected by (13) but not by (14).
B. Checking for pairwise independence
A combination of a normality test [33] with a test for
pairwise independence [34, §15], [35] permit checking the
following condition[
zˇ⊤t zˇ
⊤
s
]⊤ ∼ N (0, I) , ∀t 6= s. (16)
As it is known, assessing that (13) holds is not equivalent to
assessing (16). This is because pairwise independence does
not imply joint independence in general. We describe below
an attacking scheme which would be detected by (13), but not
by (16).
Let the measurement dimension D = 1. As before, we feed
the output y to the Kalman filter (10), and let yˇt ∼ N (0, 1)
denote the normalized prediction error. Draw [zˇ0, zˇ−1] from
the distribution N (0, I). Then, for t ∈ N, we compute
zˇt =
{
yˇt, t even,
sign (zˇt−1zˇt−2) |yˇt| , t odd.
(17)
We first analyze pairwise independence. If t is even zˇt is
obviously independent of zˇs, for all s 6= t. So we assume that
t is odd. Suppose that at time t, the vector [zˇt−1, zˇt−2] has
distribution N (0, I). We have
p (zˇt, zˇt−1) = p (zˇt|zˇt−1) p (zˇt−1) .
Now
p (zˇt = β|zˇt−1) =
{
1
2p (|yˇt| = β) , β > 0
1
2p (− |yˇt| = β) , β ≤ 0
= φ0,1 (β) .
Also, zˇt−1 ∼ N (0, 1). Hence [zˇt, zˇt−1] ∼ N (0, I). By
symmetry, we also have that [zˇt, zˇt−2] ∼ N (0, I). Since
clearly [zˇt, zˇs] ∼ N (0, I) for any even s, it remains to be
shown that [zˇt, zˇ2s+1] ∼ N (0, I), for all s. This follows
immediately from (17), since zˇt−2 is independent of zˇ2s+1.
Then, by induction on t, we have that (17) holds for all t and
s.
Now, clearly, if t is even, [zˇt, zˇt−1, zˇt−2] ∼ N (0, I),
However, for any odd t, zˇtzˇt−1zˇt−2 ≥ 0. Then,
[zˇt, zˇt−1, zˇt−2] ≁ N (0, I) . (18)
Hence, while zˇ is clearly, AMS, in view of (18), it does not
satisfy (13). We can then draw the same conclusions as those
in Section VI-A.
6VII. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
An attack detection algorithm cannot be readily obtained
from Theorem 1 or Corollary 1. This is because this result
requires carrying out the uncountable family of tests (8).
Moreover, each of these tests requires an infinite number
of attacked samples. Hence, they cannot detect sporadic at-
tacks that last a finite time interval. Nevertheless, numerically
tractable algorithms can be readily derived using these results.
In this section we derive one such algorithms, for the case of
linear systems with Gaussian noises, based on the result from
Corollary 1. More precisely, we propose a test which, for each
time step, produces a single statistic which summarizes the
outcome of a finite number of tests (8). A similar algorithm
for detecting attacks in a general non-linear system can be
derived from the conditions of Theorem 1.
In order to cope with the fact that the family of tests (8) is
uncountable, we first point out that it is enough to consider
the largest L that the available computational resources allow.
Then, for this fixed value of L, we define a set of sample
points on RLD at which we will test condition (8). We use
ρi =
[
ρ⊤i,0, · · · , ρ⊤i,L−1
]⊤
, i = 1, · · · , I , to denote these points,
with ρi,l ∈ RD , l = 0, · · · , L − 1. Also, in order to go
around the limitation that the tests (8) can not detect sporadic
attacks, while in Corollary 1 Fˇ
(L)
T is computed starting from
time 1, we use a moving horizon of T time samples. Hence,
for each sample time t we define the block of samples
ζˇ
(L)
t =
[
zˇ⊤t , · · · , zˇ⊤t+L−1
]⊤
within this horizon, and build its
empirical CDF
Fˇ
(L)
t,T (ρ) =
1
T
t∑
s=t−T+1
ξs, with ξs = χ{ζˇ(L)s ρ
}(ρ). (19)
We then sample Fˇ
(L)
t,T and Φ0,I at the points ρi, i = 1, · · · , I ,
forming the vectors ut,T ∈ RI and u ∈ RI , respectively,
defined by
[ut,T ]i = Fˇ
(L)
t,T (ρi) , and [u⋆]i = Φ0,I (ρi) . (20)
We next define the following weighted difference between the
above vectors
vt,T = T (ut,T − u⋆)⊤ Σ−1 (ut,T − u⋆) ,
where Σ =
∑
τ∈ZΣ(τ), with
Σ(τ) = E¯⋆
{
(ξτ − u¯) (ξ0 − u¯)⊤
}
.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 1. Under nominal statistics,
lim
T→∞
vt,T
D
= χ2 (I) , for all t ∈ Z,
where χ2 (I) is a chi-squared distribution with I degrees of
freedom.
Proof: We can write ut,T and u⋆ as
ut,T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ξt, and u⋆ = E¯⋆ {ξ0} .
Let wt,T =
√
TΣ−1/2 (ut,T − u⋆). It follows from (19) that,
under nominal statistics, the sequence (ξt : t ∈ N) is (L− 1)-
independent (i.e., ξt and ξs are independent whenever t− s >
L−1). Hence, in view of the vector version of [36, Th. 27.4],
obtained by using the Crame´r-Wold theorem [36, Th. 29.4],
we obtain
lim
T→∞
wt,T
D
= N (0, I) . (21)
Now vt,T can be written as
vt,T = ‖wt,T ‖22 =
I∑
i=1
[wt,T ]
2
i . (22)
Then, the result follows from (21) and the continuous mapping
theorem [36, Corollary 1 of Th. 25.7].
Let HI denote the CDF of a chi-squared distribution with I
degrees of freedom. We define the confidence ψt,T of rejecting
the null hypothesis (i.e., of asserting that there is an attack) at
time t by
ψt,T = HI (vt,T ) . (23)
In view of Proposition 1, ψt,T is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Hence, for a given alarm triggering threshold 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
on ψt,T , the false alarm rate πt,T at time t (i.e., the probability
of triggering an alarm when there is no attack), is given by
πt,T = p (ψt,T ≥ α) = 1− α.
In order to compute ψt,T we need expressions for ξt, u⋆
and Σ. These are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. For each i, j = 1, · · · , I , we have
[ξt]i =
L−1∏
l=0
χ{zˇt+lρi,l}, and [u⋆]i =
L−1∏
l=0
Φ0,I (ρi,l) , (24)
and
[Σ]i,j =
−L+1∑
t=0
−t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,t+L+τ )Φ0,I (ρj,τ )×
×
L+t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ ∧ ρj,−t+τ )
+
L−1∑
t=1
t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ )Φ0,I (ρj,L−t+τ )×
×
L−t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,t+τ ∧ ρj,τ )
− (2L− 1)
L−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ )Φ0,I (ρj,τ ) . (25)
Proof: Equation (24) follows straightforwardly from (20).
To show (25), recall that ρi =
[
ρ⊤i,0, ρ
⊤
i,1, . . . , ρ
⊤
i,L−1
]⊤
, i =
1, · · · , I , are vectors on RLD. For all i = 1, · · · , I ,
[ξt]i =
L−1∏
l=0
χ{zˇt+lρi,l}, and [u⋆]i =
L−1∏
l=0
Φ0,I (ρi,l) .
7Then, for all i, j = 1, · · · , I , and t ∈ Z,
[Σ(τ)]i,j = E¯⋆
{
L−1∏
l=0
χ{z˜τ+lρi,l}χ{z˜lρj,l}
}
−
L−1∏
l=0
Φ0,I (ρi,l)Φ0,I (ρj,l) .
We have three cases:
1) For −L+ 1 ≤ t ≤ 0,
[Σ(t)]i,j =
[
−t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,t+L+τ )Φ0,I (ρj,τ )
]
×
×
[
L+t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ ∧ ρj,−t+τ )
−
L+t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ )Φ0,I (ρj,−t+τ )
]
.
2) For any 0 < t ≤ L− 1,
[Σ(t)]i,j =
[
t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,τ ) Φ0,I (ρj,L−t+τ )
]
×
×
[
L−t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,t+τ ∧ ρj,τ )
−
L+t−1∏
τ=0
Φ0,I (ρi,t+τ )Φ0,I (ρj,τ )
]
.
3) For any t > L− 1 or t < −L+ 1, [Σ(t)]i,j = 0.
The result then follows by summing up [Σ(t)]i,j for all
t ∈ Z.
The proposed method assesses the presence of an attack
by measuring the squared distance between the nominal and
empirical CDFs of ζˇ
(L)
1 . Since the domain of these functions
is RLD, their distance is measured over the grid sample points
ρi ∈ RLD, i = 1, · · · , I . In order to complete the description
of the method, we need a criterion for choosing these points.
To this end, we apply the generalized Lloyd’s algorithm [37,
S 11.3] to the nominal probability distribution of ζˇ
(L)
1 , i.e.,
N (0, I). We then obtain the algorithm summarized in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Attack detection test
Initialization: choose T, L, I ∈ N and a threshold α > 0.
1) Run Lloyd’s algorithm on the LD-dimensional distribu-
tion N (0, I), to obtain ρi ∈ RLD, i = 1, · · · , I .
2) Using the points ρi, i = 1, · · · , I , compute u⋆ and Σ.
Main loop: at time t, let τ = t−L+1 and run the following
steps.
1) Run the Kalman filter (10) to obtain zˆt|t−1.
2) Compute zˇt using (11).
3) Compute ζˇ
(L)
τ using zˇτ , · · · , zˇt.
4) Compute ut,T using ζˇ
(L)
τ−T+1, · · · , ζˇ(L)τ .
5) Using ut,T compute vT .
6) Compute ψT using vT and (23).
7) Trigger an alarm if ψT ≥ α.
Remark 3. Algorithm 1 is an approximation of the family
of tests (12). The key property of this algorithm is that this
approximation can be made arbitrarily accurate by increasing
the values of T , L and I .
Remark 4. Concerning the choice of the time horizon T ,
while a large value increases the accuracy and therefore the
sensitivity of the detector to the presence of an attack, it also
decreases the detection speed, i.e., the time that the detector
takes to react to the occurrence of an attack. Hence, in a prac-
tical implementation, T need to be chosen to accommodate
a trade off between sensitivity and speed. It is also possible
to achieve a combination of high detection speed to strong
attacks and high sensitivity for detecting subtle attacks with
slow detection speed, by running in parallel two instances of
the same method, one with a small time horizon and the other
with a large one.
VIII. SIMULATION
In this section we illustrate our proposed method. Since
this method checks that the joint statistics (JS) of a block of
contiguous samples equal their nominal values, we refer to it
as JS. We compare the JS method with other two. The first
one is the method described in Section VI-B, which checks
for the normality as well as pairwise independence (NPI) of
samples of zˇ. To do so, the method compares the joint CDFs
of the vector
[
zˇ⊤t , zˇ
⊤
t−l
]⊤
, for all values l = 1, · · · , L − 1,
using a procedure similar to the one described in Section VII.
This yields the L− 1 statistics v(l)t,T , l = 1, · · · , L− 1, which
are computed as in (22). We refer to this method as NPI.
The second method is the one described in [27, eqs. (6)-(7)].
This method checks that the second order (SO) statistics of
samples of the prediction error z˜ equal their nominal values.
In our notation, it defines
vt,T = z˜
⊤
t Γz˜t ∼ χ (D) .
We refer to this method as SO.
To do the comparison, we use a system with A = 0.98,
C = 1, R = 0.1 and Q = 0.1. Also, for the JS and NPI
methods we use I = 100, L = 3 and T = 100.
In the first experiment we consider the attack described
in (15), with τ = 1 and α = 1/
√
2. As described in
Section VI-A, this attack introduces statistical dependence
between samples of zˇ which are τ samples away from each
other. However, these samples remain uncorrelated. The left
sides of Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the values of the statistic vt,T
for the methods JS, NPI and SO, respectively. We see how the
SO method is unable to detect the appearance of the attack at
time t = 25× 103.
In the second experiment, we consider the attack described
in (17). As explained in that section, this attack introduces
statistical dependence between three consecutive samples of zˇ,
while leaving all samples from zˇ being pairwise independent.
The values of vt,T for the methods JS, NPI and SO, are shown
at the right sides of Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We see
that in this case, only the JS method is able to detect the
appearance of the attack.
8Remark 5. As stated in Corollary 1, checking (12), for
arbitrarily large L and all ρ, guarantees the detection of
all asymptotically detectable attacks. However, recall that
algorithm JS only checks (12) for a fixed L and a finite
number of points ρi ∈ RLD, i = 1, · · · , I . Hence, certain
asymptotically detectable attacks can escape the detection of
algorithm JS. While the set of escaping attacks can be made
arbitrarily small by increasing L and I , there exists always the
possibility that some attack can escape algorithm JS but not
other algorithm like SO.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of vt,T yield by the JS detection method under attack (15)
(left) and attack (17) (right).
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Fig. 2. Evolution of v
(1)
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and v
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yield by the NPI detection method under
attack (15) (left) and attack (17) (right).
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Fig. 3. Evolution of vt,T yield by the SO detection method [27] under
attack (15) (left) and attack (17) (right).
IX. CONCLUSION
We studied the attack detection problem on stochastic cyber-
physical systems. We introduced the definition of asymptotic
detectable attacks, as the set of attacks that can be detected by
some method based on the knowledge of a single realization,
and with probability bigger than zero over the space of
realizations. We also characterized this set by providing a
necessary and sufficient condition for stochastic detectability.
Using this condition, we derived a practically realizable attack
detection algorithm. We present simulation results showing
how our algorithm can detect attacks that cannot be detected
by some simpler methods.
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